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ABSTRACT
Er is reeds zeer veel onderzoek verricht naar de kapitaalstructuur van voorna-
melijk beursgenoteerde bedrijven. Gebruik makende van een databank van Bel-
gische beursgenoteerde en niet beursgenoteerde bedrijven, onderzoeken wij niet
enkel de determinanten van de schuldgraad maar ook de invloed van een beurs-
notering op de relatie tussen de determinanten en de kapitaalstructuur zelf. Onze
resultaten zijn in grote mate vergelijkbaar met vroegere onderzoeken en onder-
steunen voornamelijk de Pecking Order theorie. Ook in lijn met de Pecking Order
theorie blijkt dat beursgenoteerde bedrijven minder schuld opnemen, zelfs indien
we controleren voor andere determinanten van schuldgraad. Daarnaast tonen we
ook aan dat de determinanten van kapitaalstructuur inderdaad verschillen tussen
beursgenoteerde en niet beursgenoteerde ondernemingen.
* * *
The design of capital structure in quoted companies has received much attention
in the academic literature. Using panel data from quoted as well as non quoted
Belgian companies, this paper investigates not only the determinants of capital
structure, but also the influence of a stock listing on the relationship between
these determinants and leverage. Overall our empirical results are in line with pre-
vious studies and support mainly the Pecking Order theory. Also in line with the
predictions of the Pecking Order theory, quoted companies are less levered, even
when controlling for other determinants of capital structure. Furthermore we find
that the determinants of capital structure differ to some extend between quoted
and non quoted companies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important decisions confronting a firm in corporate
finance, is the design of its capital structure. Since the work of Modigliani
and Miller (1958) many studies have been devoted to the question of
how much leverage (i.e. the relative amount of debt in the capital struc-
ture) a firm should take on, and why. In this paper we investigate the
determinants of leverage on a sample of Belgian panel data and – novel
to the literature – test whether these determinants differ between com-
panies that are quoted on the stock exchange and those that are not.
Our empirical evidence on the determinants of capital structure is in
line with previous studies. Furthermore we find that quoted companies
have less debt in their capital structure all else being equal. This result
stresses the importance of information asymmetries and the availability
of financing alternatives open to quoted firms. The main explanations
are on the one hand the lower information costs due to higher levels of
transparency in quoted companies and on the other hand the extra infor-
mation financial markets typically generate about public firms. Next to
that, quoted companies also have more financing alternatives and thus
higher bargaining power towards their suppliers of finance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II con-
tains a review of the literature on the determinants of capital structure,
and whether or not, one would expect a difference between quoted
and non quoted firms. Next, section III describes the data and the def-
inition of the variables. Section IV discusses the results, and finally
Section V offers some conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several important theories about capital structure choice have been
developed. After a quick summary of the main ideas, we discuss the
implication of these theories for firms, and this depending upon spe-
cific firm characteristics. In a next step we evaluate whether or not,
and how, these theories help to explain differences in capital structure
between quoted and non quoted firms.
Trade-Off theory
The Trade-Off perspective is the oldest theory and is immediately
linked to the insights from Miller and Modigliani on capital structure.
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It predicts that companies optimize their debt level such that marginal
tax advantages of additional borrowing are offset by the increase in
the costs of financial distress. Specifically, since interest payments are
tax deductible, raising more debt increases the tax benefit. However
an increase in debt also increases the probability of default and hence
the expected cost of bankruptcy.
Pecking Order theory
A next strand of literature is the Pecking Order Theory pioneered by
Myers and Majluf (1984). This literature focuses on information costs
and signaling effects. Specifically, in their seminal paper from 1984,
Myers and Majluf show that companies prefer to finance their projects
from internally generated cash flows. When this source of financing
is exhausted, they move on to debt, and only when also the latter
source does not suffice to fill financing needs, additional equity is
issued. This hierarchy materializes because of differences in financ-
ing costs. Issuing additional equity is the most expensive means of
financing as it suffers the most from information asymmetries between
managers, existing shareholders and potentially new shareholders; in
view of its fixed payments, debt is already less sensitive to informa-
tion problems, while internally generated resources do not suffer at all
from issuing costs. According to the Pecking Order Theory external
financing would only be used when there is an imbalance between
internal funds and real investment opportunities.
Signaling theory
The signaling effect, proposed by Ross (1977), is another capital struc-
ture theory based on asymmetric information. According to Ross
investors interpret higher levels of debt as a signal of higher quality
and higher future cash flows. Lower quality firms cannot mimic higher
quality firms by taking on more debt because they have higher
expected costs of bankruptcy at any level of debt.
Agency theory
Asymmetric information does not only cause issuance and signaling
costs, it also is at the root of agency problems. In fact, in the framework
of agency theory, there is a strand of literature studying the impact of
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debt on sub optimal managerial decision making. One major perspec-
tive here is the free cash flow approach put forward by Jensen (1986).
In cash flow rich companies, managers may be tempted to spend abun-
dant resources not too wisely and engage in negative net present value
projects. In order to mitigate this potential conflict of interest between
the management and the owners, leverage can be increased. For the
mandatory payments of interest and principal reduces the cash flow
available for spending at the discretion of managers. However, instead
of solving the over investment problem, leverage can also lead to the
opposite problem. When the proceeds would mainly benefit the debt
holders, firms may be tempted to under invest (see Myers (1977)).
The under investment problem will be more severe for companies
whose value consists principally of future growth options, so that these
companies are better off using equity. Due to the investment opportu-
nities, these companies have more chances of being short of cash. Under
such circumstances the pressure of the debt servicing is likely to ham-
per firms in the implementation of their investment programs.
Studies on capital structure usually focus on publicly quoted firms,
so that research that systematically investigates differences in lever-
age between public and non public companies is absent. Neverthe-
less, the latter issue is meaningful as both categories of companies are
likely to differ with respect to corporate strategy, investment oppor-
tunities, financial constraints and information conditions in general.
Below, using the insights from the theories reviewed above, a first
subsection discusses the link between firm characteristics and lever-
age as proposed so far in the literature; the second subsection consid-
ers the likely impact of a stock market quotation.
A. Firm characteristics
Previous theories imply that, depending upon firm characteristics, the
optimal capital structure differs across firms. Below we discuss them
one by one. Table 1 contains for every capital structure theory
reviewed above, the hypothesized sign of the relationship between
leverage and a particular firm characteristic.
Size
A first important firm characteristic studied in the literature is size.
Several papers predict a positive relationship between size and
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leverage (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995), among others). The expla-
nation offered is that information asymmetries are smaller for large
companies so that the latter have easier access to the market of debt
finance. Hence, at least when compared to internally generated funds,
issuance costs of debt financing decrease, so that this mode of financ-
ing becomes more attractive. Therefore one could argue that the Peck-
ing Order theory would predict a positive relationship between size
and leverage. However Titman and Wessels (1988) note that both the
cost of issuing debt and equity securities is related to firm size.
As issuing equity is relatively much more costly for small firms as
compared to the costs for large ones, small firms may be more lever-
aged than large companies. Furthermore to reduce issuance costs even
more, small firms may prefer to borrow short term (through bank
loans) rather than issue long term debt. Hence, if there are major dif-
ferences in the way size impacts on the issuance costs of alternative
sources of financing, a negative relationship between size and lever-
age may also materialize within the Pecking Order logic. From the
perspective of the Trade-Off theory one would expect that, as large
companies tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy,
the latter firms would opt for more debt in their capital structure.
As more information is available for large firms, there is also less
need for quality signaling through high debt levels by those firms.
Furthermore, in view of the availability of more information, the
agency perspective would also predict less need for debt as a disci-
plining device. Hence signaling and agency perspectives would pre-
dict a negative relationship between size and leverage. Overall, pre-
ceding discussion shows that finance theory is not unambiguous about
its prediction of the impact of firm size on leverage. Empirical results
suffer from the same problem. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find a pos-
itive relationship for the US, UK, Japan and Canada. For France they
report no effect while the impact for Germany is negative. Other
authors like Titman and Wessels (1988) find no relationship for the
US. For Belgium, Deloof and Verschueren (1998) report a positive
relationship between size and leverage, but when looking separately
at short term debt, this study does not find a relationship with size.
Profitability
Another important firm characteristic that may influence capital struc-
ture is profitability. As indicated above, the Pecking Order Theory of
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Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that firms prefer financing through
retained earnings, then move to debt and as a last resort issue new
equity. Consequently, firms with high past profitability and hence
opportunities to retain earnings, should have lower debt. By contrast,
the Trade-Off theory would predict a positive effect since profitable
firms are less likely to go bankrupt, and hence can sustain more debt,
thereby capturing more tax advantages. Also agency based theories
like the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) predict a positive rela-
tionship between profitability and leverage: in profitable firms with
excess cash flow, a higher debt level is needed to refrain managers
from engaging in sub optimal investment projects. Finally as high
profitability may serve as an alternative signal of quality, there is less
need for profitable firms to take on high leverage to distinguish them-
selves from lower quality companies. Hence the signaling perspective
would predict a negative relationship between leverage and prof-
itability. Most empirical studies find a negative relationship between
profitability and leverage in line with the Pecking Order and signal-
ing theories (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wes-
sels (1988) among others).
Risk
The variability of profits – a proxy for company risk – is hypothesized
to be negatively related to leverage. Specifically, the Trade-Off theory
implies that the expected cost of financial distress increases with risk,
while the chances that the tax shield will be (fully) used decrease.
Simultaneously, risk also exacerbates the negative impact of asym-
metric information and debtors are likely to protect themselves by
strengthening conditions in debt contracts. Consequently as direct and
indirect costs of debt increase, the Pecking Order Hypothesis also
implies a negative relationship between risk and leverage. By con-
trast, the agency and signaling perspectives would both predict more
leverage as risk increases. For, as argued above, risk exacerbates the
negative impact of asymmetric information, increasing the need for
quality signaling and disciplining. Similar to theoretical predictions,
empirical findings concerning this firm characteristic are not unam-
biguous either. Titman and Wessels (1988) report a negative but non
significant relationship, while Bennet and Donnelly (1993) find a pos-
itive impact. Deloof and Verschueren (1998) obtain a significantly
negative relationship for Belgian data.
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Growth
The literature is also unclear about the relationship between firm
growth and leverage. According to the Trade-Off theory, growth com-
panies borrow less because of increased expected costs of bankruptcy.
Specifically, growth opportunities are intangible; they increase the
value of the firm but they cannot be collateralized. Also from the
agency perspective growth companies should have lower leverage.
For, as already argued before, growth companies have continuously
large cash flow needs and are therefore hampered in their normal
investment decisions by the pressure of the additional cash outflows
for debt servicing. Because internal financing is not likely to fill the
needs of these firms, the Pecking Order Theory would predict that
growth companies are likely to hold more debt. Finally, as growth
may serve as an alternative quality signal, the signaling perspective
would hypothesize less need for leverage. Again, also empirical find-
ings show conflicting results. Rajan and Zingales (1995) report a neg-
ative relationship between growth and leverage, while Titman and
Wessels (1988) do not find any connection. Deloof and Verschueren
(1998) report a positive relationship for Belgian data.
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TABLE 1
Hypotheses of the determinants of leverage according to different theories
Determinants Pecking Order Trade-Off Signaling Agency
Size +/– + – –
Profitability – + – +
Risk – – + +
Growth + – – –
Tangibility + + n.a. –
Current Assets + + n.a. –
Non-debt Tax Shield n.a. – n.a. n.a.
Stock Listing +/– + + +
+: positive impact
–: negative impact
n.a.: not applicable
Type of asset and non-debt tax shields
The last two important determinants of leverage studied in the litera-
ture are type of assets and non-debt tax shields. Turning to type of
assets first, there is a strand of literature investigating the collateral
value of assets. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that managers may
reduce the cost of debt by issuing secured debt. Therefore they expect
firms with assets that can be collateralized to use more leverage. Sim-
ilarly, the Trade-Off theory also predicts such a positive relationship
as firms with a relatively large portion of tangible assets also have a
higher liquidation value, which in turn reduces bankruptcy costs. Nei-
ther the Signaling nor the Agency perspective are very helpful in for-
mulating relevant hypothesis concerning the link between tangibility
and leverage, except perhaps that agency problems might reduce with
the increase of tangible assets because there may be less room for
abuse by management. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find a positive rela-
tionship between tangibility and leverage for all the G-7 countries in
their sample. Deloof and Vershueren (1998) find a negative relation-
ship between intangibility, which can be seen as an inverse measure
of tangibility, and leverage. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
study the relative importance of short term versus long term assets.
They argue that there should be a positive relationship between short
term assets and leverage, simply because usually firms finance short
term assets with debt while fixed assets are mainly financed by inter-
nally generated resources. Overall, capital structure theories have not
much to say about the link between the proportion of short term assets
and leverage. At the most one could argue that, as short term assets
may be more difficult to collateralize on average, the arguments
offered above for tangibility may also be valid to some extend. Finally,
the non debt tax shield is a characteristic that fits in with the Trade-
Off theory of capital structure. Titman and Wessels (1988) indicate
that tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are sub-
stitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. Therefore it can be
assumed that firms with large non debt tax shields include less debt
in their capital structure. By contrast one may also argue that firms
with substantial non debt tax shields should have considerable tangi-
ble assets. Consequently there is more room for cheap borrowing,
which may induce firms to use more leverage. Empirical evidence is
also mixed. De Miguel and Pindado (2001) report a negative rela-
tionship for Spanish data. Conversely, Titman and Wessels (1988) do
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not find a link between non debt tax shields and leverage while
Gardner and Trzcinka (1992) show a positive impact.
B. Leverage and stock listing
The literature points out several advantages a firm can extract from
having its shares quoted on a stock exchange. Stock markets allow effi-
cient risk sharing and provide informative stock prices. The informa-
tion contained in stock prices helps to improve allocation of invest-
ment and creates opportunities for setting up effective managerial
compensation schemes. Simultaneously the stock market may also pro-
vide a disciplining device by creating the danger of hostile takeovers
and by exposing managerial decisions (Allan 1993) to the market’s
assessment. A stock market quotation also has disadvantages though.
For next to costs directly related to maintaining a quotation, the dissi-
pation of ownership may create costly agency problems between own-
ers and managers, as well as information asymmetries between these
two parties. When put into the framework of capital structure theory,
preceding arguments may have a bearing on the use of leverage, as
they clearly impact on the relative costs of sources of financing.
Only very little empirical research has been devoted to differences
and similarities between quoted and non-quoted companies. One likely
reason is that in stock market oriented systems like the US and the
UK, traditionally one focuses on quoted companies. Another reason is
simply one of data availability. Accounting data (in the Anglo-Saxon
system) is usually much easier to gather for quoted than for non
quoted companies. Mayer and Alexander (1991) attempted to inves-
tigate the impact of stock markets on corporate performance. They
use a paired sample of quoted and non-quoted companies drawn from
the top 1000 UK firms. Their main findings are that unquoted firms
are on average smaller, have higher concentration of ownership, are
less diversified across industries and are concentrated in low technol-
ogy industries. Quoted companies seem to grow faster and be more
profitable than non quoted companies. Another important result from
Mayer and Alexander is that in their sample quoted firms prove to be
more active bidders in the takeover market. From this they conclude
that the higher growth of quoted companies is to a large extend attrib-
utable to takeover and external growth rather than internal expansion.
As indicated above, the theories concerning capital structure can
also be used to develop hypotheses about how a stock listing could
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influence leverage. Specifically, similar to size, from the perspective
of the Trade-Off theory one could argue that the increased trans-
parency reduces expected bankruptcy costs, so that public companies
would be better off using more debt than private firms. From the view
of agency theory, logic suggests less leverage for unquoted firms.
Specifically, the higher ownership concentration that one may expect
in non quoted firms, implies less need for the pressure of debt ser-
vicing as a disciplining device. Also, since for these companies less
financing is available or more costly to obtain, one would expect, sim-
ilar to the findings of Mayer and Alexander (1991) that these latter
firms choose lower growth paths or less cash flow consuming strate-
gies in general. Hence the argument by Myers (1977) about the dan-
ger for under investment associated with high debt levels would be
less of an issue for the non quoted firms. Finally, the signaling per-
spective would suggest that, as non quoted firms do not have the need
to signal their quality to the external stock market by mastering a high
debt level, non quoted firms would be better off to carry less debt than
their quoted counterparts. From the Pecking Order theory we can also
develop some propositions concerning the determinants of leverage.
Pagano et al (1998) find that companies experience a reduction in the
cost of bank credit after they went public. Furthermore these compa-
nies also prove to be able to borrow from more banks. Pagano et al
(1998) explain these results by pointing out that by going public, firms
gain bargaining power vis-à-vis financial institutions. Specifically,
public companies do not depend solely on banks as a source of exter-
nal funds. Furthermore as more and better quality information is avail-
able about them compared to their non quoted counterparts, public
firms enjoy improved access to external financial markets in general.
Hence, this argument would suggest that quoted companies may be
more highly levered. Simultaneously however, the earlier mentioned
logic of Titman and Wessels (1988) indicates that for non-quoted com-
panies the cost of issuing new equity is much larger than for a quoted
company, implying that quoted firms would be less levered as com-
pared to their non quoted counterparts. The paper by Pagano et al
(1998) contains another interesting viewpoint concerning leverage and
stock listing. It is seen that, in contrast to the United States, in Con-
tinental Europe companies do not go public to finance subsequent
investment and growth, but rather to rebalance their accounts after a
period of high investment and growth. Hence these findings suggest
that, ceteris paribus, quoted companies have lower leverage compared
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to non-quoted companies. Jain and Kini (1994) also argue that one of
the motivations to go public is the reduction of debt.
II. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
A. Sample description
The sample consists of panel data for the years 1992-2002 and uses
the set of all non financial Belgian companies issuing consolidated
statements. Information was gathered from the NBB (National Bank
of Belgium) and Van Dijck Belfirst. We don’t have 11 years of data
for all firms because each year some companies enter or leave the
sample. This solves the problem of survivorship bias since for each
year we take all firms with available consolidated data.
Table 2 reports information on the composition of our sample
according to industry. The total sample contains 587 companies from
which 119 are quoted. Almost all of these firms (94%) are (have been)
quoted on Euronext Brussels.1 The largest portion of firms in our sam-
ple are manufacturing firms (206). Companies in distribution (114)
and servicing (136) are two other important industries in our sample.
As in Belgium only parent companies may be required to publish con-
solidated accounts, the data covers only independent entities (inde-
pendent firms or business groups as a whole).
Similar to the very interesting work of Deloof and Verschueren
(1998) we test the determinants of leverage for Belgian companies.
Our work however adds in three ways to this earlier study. First we
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TABLE 2
Sample composition and industry distribution
Industry Number of firms Non Quoted Quoted
Food & Agriculture 55 45 10
Manufacturing 206 162 44
Construction 27 24 3
Distribution 114 94 20
Transportation 49 45 4
Services 136 98 38
Total firms 587 468 119
use consolidated data. The importance of this kind of information in
capital structure research is highlighted by Rajan and Zingales (1995).
These authors point out that companies with unconsolidated balance
sheets report an affiliate’s net assets as a long term investment on their
balance sheets. Consequently, if the subsidiary uses debt, these parent
firms would (incorrectly) appear to have lower leverage than otherwise
identical firms that do consolidate. Alternatively, these companies may
place the debt they take on in less visible affiliated companies and
borrow it back via inter firm trade credit. Rajan and Zingales (1995)
find, for their Japanese and German samples, that firms that do not
report consolidated balance sheets have indeed much lower leverage
than firms that do. Second, we use panel data, so that we can test both
cross sectional and time effects. Third, and novel to the literature, we
also extend capital structure research to include the impact of a stock
market quotation on the use of leverage.
B. Variable measurement issues
We use two proxies for leverage: total debt and short term debt both
divided by total assets. Since our sample consists of quoted and non
quoted companies we can only use accounting measures for the dif-
ferent types of debt. However prior studies like Titman and Wessels
(1988) have shown that empirical models based on book values give
similar findings to those based on market values. Next to measuring
leverage, we also use debt mix variables. BANKLEV proxies for the
importance of bank debt and is defined as total bank debt (long and
short term) divided by total debt. Similarly TRADCRED is calculated
as the total amount of trade credit divided by total debt and STDEBT
as short term debt divided by total debt.
We use two proxies for size: LNTA is the natural logarithm of total
assets and LNVA is the natural logarithm of value added. Profitabil-
ity is measured as the return on assets (ROA) calculated as EBIT
divided by total assets. As an alternative proxy for profitability we
also use a cash flow measure. CASHFL is calculated as net income
plus the non cash flow costs minus the non cash flow revenues. The
cash flow variable is also divided by total assets. Since the two size
(profitability) variables are highly correlated, only one of them is
included in a model.
As in Deloof and Verschueren (1998), in any one year, risk (RISK)
is proxied by the standard deviation of the return on assets for the last
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three years. This way we lose the first two years of data for our mod-
els. Company growth (GROWTH) is measured as growth in sales dur-
ing that year and can proxy for growth opportunities. Since our sam-
ple consists of quoted as well as non quoted companies, other growth
opportunity measures like Tobin’s Q or market to book are not avail-
able for this study. The non-debt tax shield (NDTAX) is calculated as
depreciation divided by total assets.
The last group of variables proxies for the type of assets. As in
Titman and Wessels (1988), for investigating the issue of collateral
value / tangibility, we use the ratio of intangible assets to total assets
(INTAS) and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to
total assets (TANGAS). The first indicator is negatively related to col-
lateral value, while the second one (representing tangible assets) is
positively correlated to it. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1996) and as discussed above, we also define the ratio of current
assets to total assets (CURAS) to investigate the relationship between
current assets and leverage.
Finally, our QUOTED dummy distinguishes between listed and non
listed companies (i.e. 1 if the firm is listed on the stock exchange in
that year). We also use industry dummies based on 2 digit NACE
codes and year dummies to account for industry and year effects.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Univariate statistics
Below we split our sample in a non quoted and quoted group and cal-
culate the means and medians for the variables defined in the previ-
ous section. The results are shown in Table 3.
Panel A includes all variables concerning leverage and debt mix.
Non-quoted companies use more leverage than the quoted ones. Non-
quoted companies hold on average about 65% of there total assets in
debt whereas for quoted companies this is only about 56%. This result
is in line with the logic of Titman and Wessels (1988) about the rela-
tive decrease in the cost of attracting equity and with the findings of
Pagano et al (1998) at the time a company goes public through an ini-
tial public offering of its shares (IPO). The overall average is also in
line with the results in Deloof and Verschueren (1998).2 Also the pro-
portion of short term debt to total assets amounts to almost 50% for
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non-quoted firms and is significantly higher than for quoted ones.
Next we calculate the proportion of short term debt in total debt to
evaluate whether or not, given a higher debt level, non-quoted com-
panies still rely relatively more on short term. Panel A shows that in
non-quoted companies short term debt accounts for almost 74% of all
leverage, which is significantly more than the 70% in quoted ones.
Thereby the use of trade credit is more popular with private firms as
compared to quoted ones. Finally Panel A shows no significant dif-
ference in the relative use of bank debt between the two sub samples.
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TABLE 3
Descriptive statistics for quoted and non quoted subsamples
PANEL A
Non quoted Quoted Test p-values
Leverage Mean 0,64263 0,56087 64,389*** 0,000
Median 0,66365 0,57374 –10,254*** 0,000
Stdebt/ta Mean 0,4713 0,3857 64,389*** 0,000
Median 0,4643 0,3585 –9,963*** 0,000
Stdebt Mean 0,73958 0,70451 14,254*** 0,000
Median 0,77362 0,72947 –4,095*** 0,000
Banklev Mean 0,29113 0,29365 0,066 0,798
Median 0,28744 0,26142 –0,108 0,914
Tradcred Mean 0,31648 0,25483 25,788*** 0,000
Median 0,27996 0,23614 –6,963*** 0,000
PANEL B
Non quoted Quoted Test p-values
Lnva Mean 10,36799 11,06203 110,057*** 0,000
Median 10,27505 11,06715 –10,910*** 0,000
Lnta Mean 11,52077 12,23690 143,979*** 0,000
Median 11,29220 12,04728 –11,172*** 0,000
Growth Mean 0,04719 0,11707 14,608*** 0,000
Median 0,04665 0,05773 –7,598*** 0,000
ROA Mean 0,05045 0,05009 0,009 0,924
Median 0,04522 0,05157 –2,366** 0,018
Cashfl Mean 0,04990 0,05139 0,161 0,688
Median 0,04711 0,05130 –2,230** 0,026
Panel B of Table 3 contains means and medians for the variables
indicating size and performance. Not surprisingly, the variable total
assets as well as the value added variable show that quoted companies
are significantly larger than non-quoted ones. Specifically, if we would
transform this numbers back to real euro values we would find that
quoted companies are on average about twice as large. Hence some
of the differences in leverage reported in Panel A above could simply
be due to this size difference. Menédez Reguejo (2002) for example,
found that small companies were more levered than large companies
and Titman and Wessels (1988) indicated, as already noted, that small
companies would have higher proportions of short term debt. Later on
we will control for size in our regression models to test whether or not
the differences remain.
Other variables in panel B are return on assets, the cash flow vari-
able and sales growth. Return on assets only differs between quoted
and non-quoted companies in median terms. Also the cash flow vari-
able differs only marginally. This implies that the quoted companies
do not outperform the non-quoted ones based on these accounting per-
formance measures. The growth of quoted firms however is signifi-
cantly higher. On average the growth in sales is twice as large for the
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PANEL C
Non quoted Quoted Test p-values
Risk Mean 0,04368 0,04729 0,098 0,755
Median 0,01387 0,01390 –1,111 0,267
Ndtax Mean 0,05838 0,07775 14,461*** 0,000
Median 0,03904 0,04635 –5,194*** 0,000
Curas Mean 0,62779 0,55681 59,767*** 0,000
Median 0,64670 0,56064 –7,287*** 0,000
Intas Mean 0,06081 0,06379 0,247 0,619
Median 0,01003 0,01435 –3,321*** 0,001
Tangas Mean 0,42415 0,43147 0,606 0,436
Median 0,43700 0,44394 –0,676 0,499
The F-test statistic for the means test and the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Z-statis-
tic for the median test are given in the respective row together with the corre-
sponding P-value. Variables are defined as in section II.B; * denotes significance
at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes signifi-
cance at the 1% level
latter, but in median terms the difference is less pronounced though
still significant on a 1% level.
The last variables of interest are shown in panel C of Table 3. The
variability of profitability captured by our risk variable does not seem
to be significantly different for the two groups. On average non quoted
as well as quoted companies have a standard deviation of about 4%
to 5%. Public companies have however significantly higher depreci-
ation tax shields. Within the context of the Trade-Off perspective, this
is consistent with the lower use of debt by these firms as they have
more competing tax shields available.
The other variables in panel C represent the tangibility or the col-
lateral value of assets. Non quoted companies have significantly more
current assets relative to total assets. This means that quoted compa-
nies have a larger proportion of fixed assets, so that, consistent with
the data, one also would expect more depreciation tax shields. The
proportion of intangible assets seems to be slightly larger for quoted
companies but tangible assets are not different between both groups.
The reason for the latter result is probably that our measure of tangi-
ble assets also includes inventories. Specifically, although not reported
in Table 3, we have also tested for the importance of inventories and
found that in non quoted companies the latter is significantly higher.3
Table 3 indicates that both relative use as well as the composition of
the debt structure differs between public and private firms. However
several determinants of leverage and debt composition also differ. In
the next section we investigate the interactions between all these vari-
ables to gain a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of lever-
age and debt composition.
B. Univariate correlations
Table 4 reports correlations between our variables of interest. Panel A
shows the results for the full sample. Note however that these are uni-
variate test results, and hence should be interpreted with care. How-
ever the correlations are useful as they yield some insights into the
properties of the sample data.
Most of the variables have signs consistent with some theoretical
hypothesis.4 Profitability (ROA), risk, intangible assets, size are sig-
nificantly negatively correlated with leverage, while there is a positive
relationship with current assets and no or only a marginal relationship
with tangible assets and growth. The correlation of non debt tax shield
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TABLE 4
Correlation matrix of the determinants of leverage
PANEL A: Correlations for the full sample
Leverage Stdebt/ta roa Risk lnta growth curas intas tangas
Leverage 0,642** –0,155** –0,102** –0,062** 0,048* 0,223** –0,312** (0,000)
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,001) (0,026) (0,000) (0,000) (0,987)
Stdebt/ta –0,128** –0,117** –0,216** 0,048* 0,578** –0,307** –0,179**
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,026) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Roa –0,140** 0,055** 0,027 0,026 –0,069** 0,086**
(0,000) (0,002) (0,187) (0,149) (0,000) (0,000)
Risk 0,048* 0,025 –0,125** 0,417** –0,075**
(0,032) (0,281) (0,000) (0,000) (0,002)
Lnta 0,047* –0,306** 0,143** 0,123**
(0,023) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Growth –0,008 –0,097** 0,019
(0,707) (0,000) (0,379)
Curas –0,387** –0,393**
(0,000) (0,000)
Intas –0,319**
(0,000)
Tangas
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Leverage Stdebt/ta roa Risk lnta growth curas intas tangas
Leverage 0,636** –0,174** –0,116** –0,080** 0,088** 0,254** –0,333** –0,002
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,937)
Stdebt/ta 0,628** –0,160** –0,099** –0,236** 0,094** 0,596** –0,306** –0,167**
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Roa –0,123** –0,063 –0,107** 0,016 0,064** 0,021 –0,074** 0,077**
(0,002) (0,114) (0,000) (0,447) (0,008) (0,302) (0,000) (0,000)
Risk –0,052 –0,196** –0,277** 0,101** 0,024 –0,120** 0,402** –0,064*
(0,275) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,384) (0,000) (0,000) (0,020)
Lnta 0,083* –0,057 0,137** –0,108* 0,104** –0,278** 0,130** 0,099**
(0,035) (0,147) (0,000) (0,014) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Growth –0,016 –0,031 –0,054 0,043 –0,119** 0,020 –0,088** 0,042
(0,714) (0,487) (0,189) (0,337) (0,004) (0,402) (0,000) (0,094)
Curas 0,065 0,476** 0,038 –0,162** –0,307** –0,034 –0,410** –0,350**
(0,103) (0,000) (0,310) (0,000) (0,000) (0,406) (0,000) (0,000)
Intas –0,246** –0,318** –0,061 0,499** 0,189** –0,123** –0,331** –0,336**
(0,000) (0,000) (0,102) (0,000) (0,000) (0,003) (0,000) (0,000)
tangas 0,014 –0,227** 0,110** –0,123** 0,180** –0,047 –0,527** –0,269**
(0,722) (0,000) (0,005) (0,008) (0,000) (0,273) (0,000) (0,000)
Pearson correlation matrices for leverage variables and determinants. P-values of the two-tailed Pearson’s correlation test in paren-
theses; * denotes significance at the 5% level; ** denotes significance at the 1% level
with leverage as well as short term debt, not reported in table 4, is sig-
nificantly negative. This is also in line with our hypothesis based on
trade off theory.
However to arrive at final conclusions, there is a need to correct
simultaneously for different firm characteristics. For example, size
seems to be negatively correlated with leverage as well as short term
debt. We also saw from the descriptive statistics in Table 3 that quoted
companies are much larger than the non quoted firms and that these
latter companies hold more debt. Hence, is leverage really negatively
related to size or rather does the negative correlation reflect the impact
of not being quoted? At least panel A of Table 4 implies that, overall,
correlations between variables are such that multicollinearity prob-
lems are limited.
Finally in panel B of Table 4 we split up our sample in a quoted and
non quoted group. The upper right part of the matrix represents the
correlation results for the non quoted sample while the lower left part
contains those for the quoted one. This way we can test for differ-
ences in relationships between variables across sub samples. For the
private firms results are largely similar to those of the full sample.
The sample of public companies however reveals that less variables
are significantly correlated with leverage. Only the proportion of short
term debt relative to total assets, ROA and intangibles show a signif-
icant relationship with leverage. Contrary to their private counterparts,
and except for intangibles, for public firms there is no correlation
between leverage and composition of asset side, growth and risk. Pos-
sibly some weak correlation with size may exist. These findings indi-
cate that the determinants of leverage are not entirely different for
quoted and non-quoted companies, but that conducting also split
regressions between subgroups is warranted.
C. Multivariate testing of the determinants of capital structure
For comparability, the basic models we test are similar to those in
Deloof and Verschueren (1998) and Rajan ans Zingales (1995). As in
Rajan and Zingales (1995) all models are tested using maximum like-
lihood regression. Compared to OLS, this technique has the advantage
that variables need not have constant variance. Hence, biases due to
heteroscedasticity are avoided. Each model was tested first without and
than with a specific firm effect (i.e. for each firm a dummy was added
to absorb company specific information). Table 5 shows the results for
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the full sample, without correcting for the fact that some firms are
quoted while others are not. The left hand side of Table 5 contains
models (A) with no firm effects. In the right hand side models (B)
firms are allowed to have random intercepts. All models are tested with
industry and year effects.5 Finally, to avoid multicollinearity, and as a
robustness check, in turn, each one of two highly correlated variables
is left out. What variable is deleted is indicated with a dash.
Models A1 to A4 all have comparable explanatory power.
The pseudo R2 is between 27% and 31%, which is comparable with
Deloof and Verschueren (1998). Another consistent result for these
four models is that the industry effects are each time very significant,
but the year effects are not.
The relationship between profitability (ROA or CASHFL) and
leverage is significantly negative. This result is contradicting the
Trade-Off theory as well as the signaling explanations of capital struc-
ture but is in line with the Pecking Order Theory proposed by Myers
and Majluf (1984) as well as the Agency perspective.
The second determinant of interest, risk, has a negative relationship
with the proportion of total debt, as predicted by both the Trade-Off
theory and the Pecking Order logic. It contradicts however both the
Agency and Signalling perspectives.
In none of the four models the coefficients of the size variables
(LNTA or LNVA) are significant and may not even be of the predicted
sign. This is in contrast to the results in Deloof and Verschueren
(1998). However Rajan and Zingales (1995) do not find a significant
relationship between size and leverage either on their French and
Italian samples.
The growth variable has a positive coefficient that is very signifi-
cant in the four models. The positive relationship between growth and
leverage is again in line with the Pecking Order perspective and con-
tradicts the other views. For, consistent with Pecking Order theory,
fast growing companies use up much cash flow and are therefore
forced to turn to debt once the internally generated resources have
been exhausted.
Another variable that is used in all four models is the proportion of
current assets. The sign of the CURAS coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1% level for most models. This result is in line with the
arguments of Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) that current
assets are mainly financed with debt. It is also consistent with both the
Trade-Off and Pecking Order perspectives.
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TABLE 5
Determinants of leverage
No fixed firm effects Fixed firm effects
A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4
Intercept 0.6019*** 0.5981*** 0.6858*** 0.6726*** 0.5020*** 0.5518*** 0.6513*** 0.6225***
(7.59) (7.77) (8.93) (8.42) (2.80) (3.12) (3.68) (3.45)
ROA –0.5691*** –0.6531*** –0.5915*** – –0.4939*** –0.5940*** –0.4992*** –
(–8.74) (–9.00) (–9.17) (–9.16) (–9.90) (–9.22)
Cashfl – – – –0.5683*** – – –0.5222***
(–8.62) (–9.43)
Risk –0.0779*** –0.0672** –0.0581** –0.0766*** –0.0384* –0.0439 –0.0364 –0.0377*
(–3.94) (–2.07) (–2.29) (–3.84) (–1.75) (–1.06) (–1.49) (–1.71)
Lnta 0.0027 – 0.0032 –0.0004 0.0184*** – 0.0141*** 0.0116**
(0.81) (0.97) (–0.13) (3.58) (2.72) (2.17)
Lnva – 0.0042 – – – 0.0152*** – –
(1.22) (2.91)
Growth 0.0375*** 0.0443*** 0.0274** 0.0372*** 0.0117* 0.0135* 0.0102 0.0058
(3.39) (3.38) (2.49) (2.98) (1.88) (1.76) (1.62) (0.81)
Curas 0.2358*** 0.2271*** 0.1450*** 0.2205*** 0.1162*** 0.1173*** 0.0196 0.0948***
(9.51) (8.94) (5.91) (8.74) (3.99) (3.95) (0.65) (3.28)
Tangas 0.0574** 0.04889** – 0.0850*** 0.0785*** 0.0662*** – 0.0950***
(2.51) (2.08) (3.67) (3.44) (2.86) (4.14)
Intas – – –0.2849*** – – – –0.1959*** –
(–7.32) (–5.23)
610 No fixed firm effects Fixed firm effects
A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4
Firm effect No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat ind. 7.96*** 7.73*** 7.89*** 7.67*** 1.88*** 1.73*** 1.83*** 1.81***
F-stat year 0.43 0.45 0.56 0.55 1.64 2.11** 1.74* 2.24**
Pseudo R2 0.286 0.272 0.308 0.284 0.875 0.872 0.874 0.877
Maximum likelihood regressions with leverage as dependent variable. T-tatistics in parentheses; Variables are as defined in Section II. B;
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
The last determinant of leverage tested in our models is the collat-
eral value of assets. Following Titman and Wessels (1988) we use two
alternative measures (i.e. TANGAS and INTAS). The estimate for
these variables is in line with the Trade-Off and Pecking Order theo-
ries (positive for TANGAS since more tangible assets are available to
serve as collateral and negative for the measure of the importance of
intangibles INTAS).
The right hand side of Table 5 shows the results of the same mod-
els but tested with firm specific intercepts. Because of the inclusion
of this firm specific intercept, the fit statistic, pseudo R2, is much
higher and reaches almost 0,88. In contrast to the left hand side mod-
els, the year effects become much more important while the industry
effects remain highly significant. This result is not entirely unexpected.
By imposing a fixed firm effect for each company, much of the cross-
sectional variation of leverage is eliminated. This way inter temporal
variation gains in importance, leading to the significant year effects.
A comparison of the models without fixed firm effects (A) and the
models with fixed firm effects (B) shows one important difference.
The size variables LNTA and LNVA are significantly positively related
with leverage in the fixed effect models. Hence, all else being equal,
larger companies hold relatively more debt in their capital structure as
was predicted by all the capital structure theories. The size effect how-
ever was not significant in the models with no fixed firm effects. From
this we can conclude that the size effect is more inter temporally than
cross sectionally evident. This finding again is consistent with the
Pecking Order perspective, as contrary to the other theories, the
dynamics of leverage is a fundamental part of its logic. The different
results for the fixed effect models indicate that each firm has its own
starting level of leverage; then this level is adjusted depending upon
the firm specific values of the different determinants. This is consis-
tent with the notion that path dependency is important (as implied by
the Pecking Order theory) or that the firm specific dummies capture
the impact of missing variables. Importance of path dependency and
history – this would be captured by the firm specific intercepts – could
also explain why in the fixed effects models growth loses much of its
significance. For, according to the Pecking Order theory, past growth
would lead to higher starting levels of leverage, differences which are
captured by the firm dummies. Growth would then continue to cap-
ture mainly cross sectional yearly short term effects. This interpreta-
tion also implies that growth is more related to the level of the firm
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dummies as compared to size, so that, once these dummies are
included, less variation in the data is left to be captured by our growth
variable.
Other determinants like profitability (ROA, CASHFL), current
assets (CURAS), collateral value of assets (TANGAS, INTAS) hold
the same sign and significance as in the former models. However the
risk variable (RISK) suffers from a decrease in significance. This
could suggest that this variable contains much noise, so that a simple
firm specific adjustment like a dummy is capable of partially attract-
ing its explanatory power. It is also consistent with the notion that
long term effects are, at least to some extend, captured by the dummy,
while yearly short term effects are reflected in RISK.
In sum we can conclude from table 5 that the results are in line
with other empirical research concerning capital structure. Overall the
findings lend most support to Pecking Order theory.
D. The impact of stock listing
The univariate test results of table 3 showed that quoted companies are
relatively less debt financed as compared to private firms. In the fol-
lowing models, we test whether this effect remains when we control
for other determinants of capital structure. Therefore we include a
QUOTED dummy in previous regression models. However, because
of the similarity in results for the models A1, A2, A3 and A4 in Table
5, we only continue with model A1. The first column of Table 6 con-
tains the model without fixed firm effects, while in column 2 fixed
firm effects are used.
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that the QUOTED dummy adds
explanatory power to the model. The coefficient has a value of –0.0407
and is significant at a 1% level. Hence, controlling for other determi-
nants of capital structure, quoted firms have lower leverage as com-
pared to non quoted ones. This finding is consistent with the Pecking
Order view and with the findings of Pagano et al (1998) on European
stock market introductions. All other results remain similar to those
obtained before. However, the differences in correlation structure as
reflected in Table 4 indicates that relationships between the variables
within the sub samples of quoted and unquoted firms may be differ-
ent. Furthermore the Pecking Order theory stresses the fact that, when
information conditions change (as is the case when a firm becomes
quoted), relative costs of alternative sources of finance change also.
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This implies an alteration in the parameters of the implicit decision
models firms are faced with. Therefore, in order to test whether the
determinants of capital structure are different for quoted and non-
quoted companies, we split up our sample in two groups and retest the
models. The results are shown in Table 7 where the left hand side rep-
resents the non quoted sample and the right hand side the quoted one.
Several differences appear between the private and public compa-
nies. The variable measuring risk has a negative relationship with
leverage but the coefficient is no longer significant for the quoted
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TABLE 6
Impact of stock listing on leverage
Leverage
No fixed firm effects Fixed firm effects
Intercept 0.5856*** 0.4630***
(7.40) (2.60)
ROA –0.5623*** –0.4792***
(–8.64) (–8.92)
Risk –0.0806*** –0.0386*
(–4.08) (–1.77)
Lnta 0.0051 0.0225***
(1.50) (4.34)
Growth 0.0399*** 0.0113*
(3.62) (1.82)
Curas 0.2247*** 0.1059***
(9.02) (3.64)
Tangas 0.0561** 0.0789***
(2.46) (3.48)
Quoted –0.0407*** –0.0783***
(–3.89) (–4.39)
Firm effect No Yes
F-stat ind. 7.43*** 1.75***
F-stat year 0.41 1.41
Pseudo R2 0.293 0.876
Maximum likelihood regressions with leverage as dependent variable. T-tatistics
in parentheses; Variables are as defined in Section II. B;
* denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level;
*** denotes significance at the 1% level.
sample. The size variable has a positive coefficient for quoted com-
panies in the fixed firm effect models as well as the no fixed firm
effect models. This indicates that size is a relatively more important
determinant of capital structure for quoted companies.
An important difference between quoted and non quoted compa-
nies is the impact of growth on the proportion of debt. For public
companies high growth does not necessarily result in more debt.
The coefficient of growth has a positive sign but is not significant in
the quoted sample. An explanation for this could be that quoted
companies have more alternative forms of financing, so that their
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TABLE 7
Determinants of leverage on separate samples of quoted and non quoted firms
Non-quoted sample Quoted sample
No fixed firm Fixed firm No fixed firm Fixed firm 
effects effects effects effects
Intercept 0.6696*** 0.5152** 0.0921 0.1219
(7.33) (2.77) (0.54) (0.55)
ROA –0.5481*** –0.5546*** –0.5547*** –0.2486**
(–6.96) (–9.29) (–3.82) (–1.99)
Risk –0.0758*** –0.0299 –0.0433 –0.0579
(–3.64) (–1.35) (–0.43) (–0.66)
Lnta –0.0028 0.0183*** 0.0281*** 0.0297***
(–0.62) (2.99) (4.62) (2.99)
Growth 0.0512*** 0.0136* 0.0231 0.0083
(3.70) (1.87) (1.25) (0.71)
Curas 0.2153*** 0.1052*** 0.2290*** 0.0451
(6.96) (3.26) (3.83) (0.61)
Tangas 0.0797*** 0.0898*** –0.0380 0.0305
(3.07) (3.75) (–0.68) (0.47)
Firm effect No Yes No Yes
F-stat ind. 5.16*** 1.57** 6.38*** 1.38*
F-stat year 0.34 2.54*** 0.88 1.13
Pseudo R2 0.279 0.893 0.429 0.813
Maximum likelihood regressions with leverage as dependent variable. T-tatistics
in parentheses; Variables are as defined in Section II. B; * denotes significance
at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes signifi-
cance at the 1% level.
financial structure is less dependent upon using (bank)debt once inter-
nally generated funds are exhausted. Rajan and Zingales (1995), who
only considered public firms in their sample, already found a negative
relationship or no significant relationship between growth and lever-
age. Similarly, current assets is also less important as a determinant
of leverage for quoted companies, especially in the model with fixed
firm effects. Again the argument that quoted companies have more
financial flexibility could be used here. Another important difference
between quoted and non quoted companies seems to be the collateral
value of assets. While the tangibility has a strong positive relationship
with leverage for private companies, this relationship does not seem
to exist for public firms. This indicates that quoted enterprises are less
dependent upon collateral value to obtain debt. For quoted companies
are less likely to go bankrupt and information asymmetries are lower
than with non quoted companies. Therefore collaterability will be less
of an issue in the negotiation of debt contracts. On top the evidence
in authors like Pagano et al. (1998) supports the notion that quoted
companies have more bargaining power with financial institutions.
Ceteris paribus, this also reduces the need of offering collateral. Over-
all the evidence in Table 7 is consistent with the Pecking Order per-
spective and suggests that quoted companies have more financial flex-
ibility, so that, when internal financial resources are exhausted,
contrary to their private counterparts, they are less dependent on debt
(e.g. to handle year to year variations in financing needs).
E. Explaining short term debt
For completeness, and following Deloof and Verschueren (1998), we
use tentatively the models of Tables 6 and 7 to explain the proportion
of short term debt in the capital structure. Panel A of Table 8 contains
the results for the full sample, while Panel B reports the split sample
regressions. Turning first to Panel A, it can be seen that there is no dif-
ference in the sign of any significant coefficient between the short
term debt and the leverage models. Also the variables that have sig-
nificant coefficients are largely the same.
There are, however, a few noteworthy differences for the short term
debt models. First of all the impact of current assets on short term
debt is about twice as large as the impact on leverage itself. This is a
logical result since current assets can change rapidly and therefore
need to be financed on a short term basis. A second remark is that
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Determinants of short term debt on full sample and separate samples of quoted and non quoted firms
Panel A Panel B
Full Sample Non-Quoted Sample Quoted Sample
No fixed firm Fixed firm No fixed firm Fixed firm No fixed firm Fixed firm
effects effects effects effects effects effects
Intercept 0.2135*** 0.3380** 0.3740*** 0.4766*** 0.0622 –0.0793
(3.04) (2.11) (4.62) (2.80) (0.44) (–0.41)
ROA –0.4496*** –0.3755*** –0.4866*** –0.4577*** –0.3788*** –0.0856
(–7.76) (–7.82) (–6.96) (–8.42) (–3.13) (–0.80)
Risk –0.0360** –0.0187 –0.0165 –0.0128 –0.1657** 0.0042
(–2.05) (–0.96) (–0.90) (–0.63) (–1.98) (0.06)
Lnta –0.0016 0.0031 –0.0164*** –0.0079 0.0192*** 0.0301***
(–0.53) (0.67) (–4.04) (–1.39) (3.80) (3.32)
Growth 0.0282*** 0.0044 0.0473*** 0.0087 0.0051 –0.0019
(2.78) (0.80) (3.84) (1.30) (0.33) (–0.19)
Curas 0.4631*** 0.2548*** 0.4615*** 0.2375*** 0.3003*** 0.2675***
(20.92) (9.78) (16.85) (8.07) (6.11) (4.17)
Tangas 0.0335* 0.0100 0.0434* 0.0219 –0.0775* –0.0494
(1.65) (0.49) (1.89) (1.00) (–1.66) (–0.90)
Quoted –0.0225** –0.0628*** – – – –
(–2.43) (–3.93)
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Panel A Panel B
Full Sample Non-Quoted Sample Quoted Sample
No fixed firm Fixed firm No fixed firm Fixed firm No fixed firm Fixed firm
effects effects effects effects effects effects
Firm effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-stat ind. 7.32*** 2.13*** 5.87*** 2.00*** 5.64*** 1.26
F-stat year 0.39 2.23** 0.76 1.70* 0.56 1.13
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.471 0.181 0.466 0.206 0.427
Maximum likelihood regressions with short term debt as dependent variable. T-tatistics in parentheses; Variables are as defined in Sec-
tion II. B; * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** denotes significance at the 5% level; *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
tangibility is much less important in the short term debt models,
which, perhaps not surprisingly, indicates that collateral value is rel-
atively more important for long term debt. Also here the coefficient
of the quoted dummy is negative and significant. Hence, controlling
for other firm characteristics, quoted companies use less short term
debt. However, overall the fit statistics of the models show that the
explanatory power of the regressions explaining short term debt is
much lower than of those explaining total debt.
In the split regressions of Panel B, the most remarkable result is
that size has a negative or no relationship with short term debt for non
quoted firms and a positive relationship for quoted ones. Profitability
and current assets have the same impact on short term debt for quoted
and non quoted firms, although for quoted firms, once the firm spe-
cific dummy is taken into account, no impact is left anymore. Simi-
larly, growth seems to be a more important driver of short term debt
for private companies. Comparable to total debt, also short term debt
is less influenced by growth in quoted companies. This could indicate
that the higher level of financial flexibility available to public firms
causes them to be less dependent upon internally generated cash
flows/uses for managing short term debt.
As our modeling of the drivers of short term debt was only tenta-
tive, our conclusions on this issue should be interpreted with care.
However, overall the empirical results seem to indicate that, just as in
the case of total leverage, publicly quoted firms use relatively less
(short term) debt. Furthermore, the data suggest that the latter firms
are less dependent upon internally generated cash flows/uses for man-
aging short term debt.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyze the main firm characteristics that, according
to the literature, are important determinants of capital structure.
We also test empirically the impact of a stock listing on the use of
leverage for Belgian firms.
For the determinants of leverage we find evidence in line with ear-
lier empirical studies. Well known firm characteristics like profitabil-
ity, growth, risk and tangibility have the expected impact on the level
of debt. Overall results are mainly consistent with the Pecking Order
theory put forward by Myers and Majluf (1984). The other important
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perspectives studied in the literature, i.e. Trade-Off, Signaling and
Agency problems get less support from our data.
Quoted companies seem to be less levered, even when controlling
for other determinants of capital structure. As discussed in the paper,
this result is in line with the Pecking Order theory. Furthermore, at
least to some extend, determinants of capital structure differ between
quoted and non-quoted firms. Profitability is an important driver of
total leverage for both subgroups. However growth, the extend to
which the company owns tangible assets, and the proportion of cur-
rent assets is more important for the capital structure of private firms.
These findings are in line with the Pecking Order theory and support
the idea that the latter type of firms are more financially constrained
as compared to the public ones.
Unfortunately static capital structure models, like the ones tested in
this paper, are not able to systematically capture the dynamic adjust-
ment in leverage ratios. Recent studies like De Miguel and Pindado
(2001) propose a dynamic model approach where observed and opti-
mal leverage may differ due to the presence of adjustment costs.
It might be interesting, for future research, to test whether the adjust-
ment process differs between quoted and non quoted companies. This
dynamic approach would shed additional light on the impact of stock
listing on capital structure. Also a more in depth analysis of the dri-
vers of short term debt would be of interest.
NOTES
1. From the 119 quoted companies in our sample, there are 13 companies that became
public during the sample period for which we have data from both their private and
public period. On the other hand there are 4 companies that went private for which
we also have data from the public as well as the private period.
2. The median leverage for our sample is 65% while Deloof and Verschueren (1998)
report 68%.
3. On average the proportion of inventory to total assets is 19% for non quoted compa-
nies compared to 16% for the quoted sample.
4. To avoid redundancy we leave out several highly correlated variables from the corre-
lation matrix like LNVA, which has a correlation with LNTA of 0.85, and cash flow
which is highly correlated (0.80) with return on assets. Also NDTAX is not included
in the correlation matrices. This is because this variable will not be included in the
regression models later on.
5. Non debt tax shields were not included in the models presented in this paper mainly
because the variable was not used in comparable studies like Deloof and Verschueren
(1998) or Rajan and Zingales (1995). We did however test the impact of our NDTAX
variable on leverage. The coefficient was negative but was not consistently significant
over all models.
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